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Abstract
Expenditures for environmental protection in the U.S. are estimated to exceed $150 billion
annually or about 2% of GDP. This estimate, based on largely self-reported information, is often
cited as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the
associated beneﬁts are measured. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures
relate to true costs. The potential for both incidental savings and uncounted burdens means that
actual costs could be either higher or lower than reported expenditures.
A signiﬁcant literature supports the notion that increases in reported environmental expendi-
tures probably understate actual economic costs. Estimates of the true cost of a dollar increase in
reported environmental spending range from $1.50 to $12.
This paper explores the relationship between reported expenditures and economic cost in the
manufacturing sector in the context of a large plant-level data set at the four-digit SIC level. We
use a cost function modeling approach which treats both environmental and non-environmental
production activities as distinct, unrelated cost minimization problems for each plant. We then
explore the possibility that these activities are, in fact, related by including reported regulatory
expenditures in the cost function for non-environmental output. Under the null hypothesis that
reported regulatory expenditures accurately measure the cost of regulation, the coefﬁcient on this
term should be zero.
In ten of eleven industries studied, including all of the heavily regulated industries, this null
hypothesis is accepted using our preferred ﬁxed-effects model. Our best estimate, based on an
expenditure weighted average of the four most heavily regulated industries, indicates that an incre-
mental dollar of reported environmental expenditure reduces non-environmental production costs
by eighteen cents with a standard error of forty-two cents. This is equivalent to saying that total
costs rise by eighty-two cents for every dollar increase in reported environmental expenditures.
Using an alternative pooled model we ﬁnd uniformly higher estimates. Although consistent with
previous results, we believe these higher estimates are biased by omitted variables characterizing
differences among plants.
Summarizing, our results enable us to reject claims that environmental spending imposes large
hidden costs on manufacturing plants. In fact, our best estimate indicates a modest though statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant overstatement of regulatory costs.
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iiiThe Cost of Environmental Protection?
Richard D. Morgenstern, William A. Pizer, and Jhih-Shyang Shih1
1 Introduction
ExpendituresforenvironmentalprotectionintheU.S. areestimatedto exceed $150billionannually
or about 2% of GDP. This estimate, based on largely self-reportedinformation, is often cited as an
assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the associated
beneﬁts are measured. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures relate to
true economic costs. Reported expenditures in the manufacturing sector reﬂect expenses that the
plant manager identiﬁes with environmental protection. Yet, the cost to society depends on the
resulting changes in total production costs and output prices. Increases in reported environmental
expenditures at the plant level may or may not result in dollar-for-dollar increases in production
costs. Speciﬁcally, the change in production costs depends on whether an increase in reported
environmental expenditures incidentally saves money, involves uncounted burdens, or has no other
consequence.2
Most research on this distinction between reported environmental expenditures and total pro-
duction costs has focused on the possibility that the former may understate the latter. Studies have
examined a number of issues, including the possible “crowding out” effect of environmental ex-
penditures on other productive investments, the importance of the so-called “new source bias” in
discouraging investment in more efﬁcient facilities, and the potential loss of operational ﬂexibility
1Theauthors areVisitingScholar, Fellow,and Research Consultant,respectively, QualityoftheEnvironmentDivi-
sion, Resources for the Future. (Morgenstern is also Associate Assistant Administrator, on leave, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency). The authors gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (Cooperative Agreement No. 821821-01-4) and technical assistance from the Center of Economic Studies
(CES), U.S. Bureau of the Census. Robert Bechtold, Arnold Reznek, and Mary Streitwieser at CES all provided
helpful assistance. At Resources for the Future, Raymond Kopp has been a continuing source of advice and support.
Dallas Burtraw, Wayne Gray, Winston Harrington, Richard Newell, Paul Portney and Kerry Smith, along with other
seminar participants at RFF, EPA, the American Petroleum Institute, Harvard University, American University and
the University of Maryland provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. The authors alone are responsible for all
remaining errors.
2Ourfocusonproductioncostsas thecorrect measure oftheresource costassociated withenvironmentalprotection
assumes that no monopolistic rents exist. If ﬁrms collect such rents, we would also need to consider the effect of
regulation on these rents (e.g., producer surplus) in order to estimate the economic cost of regulation.
1associated with environmental controls. It has also been suggested that reported environmental
expenditures fail to capture signiﬁcant managerial and other overhead costs allocable to environ-
mental protection. Data collected by industry, based on broader deﬁnitions of environmental ex-
penditure than those used by the Census Bureau, generally yields larger estimates.
In contrast, more limited research suggesting an overstatement of costs has explored the possi-
bilitythatthereiscomplementaritybetween pollutioncontroland otherproductionactivities.3 That
is, the costs of jointly producing conventional output and a cleaner environment may be lower than
if each were produced separately.4 Generally, onlyanecdotal information,along with some limited
case studies, support the notion that pollution control expenditures may be partially (or wholly)
offset by efﬁciency gains elsewhere in the ﬁrm.
Whether a $1 increase in reported environmental expenditures translates into changes in total
production costs of more or less than a $1 involves netting out a number of complex, often com-
peting effects. Frequently posed in terms of competitiveness or productivity,the prevailing view in
the economics literatureis that an incremental $1 of reportedenvironmental expenditures probably
increases total production costs by more than $1. Recent studies suggest that total costs may rise
by as much as $12 for every $1 of reported expenditures.
In our attempt to address this relationship between reported environmental expenditures and
true economic costs, we merge several large data sets containing plant-level information on re-
ported regulatory expenditures as well as prices and quantities of both inputs and outputs. The
sample consists of more than 800 different manufacturing plants for multiple industries at the 4-
digit SIC level over the period 1979-1991. We employ a cost-function modeling approach that
involves three basic steps. First, we distinguish between environmental abatement expenditures
and non-environmental production expenditures. Second, we model both the production of con-
ventional output and environmental services as distinct cost minimization problems and derive
3There is also a literature comparing ex ante to ex poste costs. That is a related but distinct issue from the one
addressed in this paper.
4Suppose a potential investment both increases efﬁciency and reduces pollution but has a slightly lower rate of
returnthan a ﬁrm’s otherinvestment opportunities. When environmentalregulationis imposed, the cost of compliance
might be relatively small since the necessary investment was almost proﬁtable when the environmental beneﬁts were
ignored.
2expressions for the resulting cost and factor input shares. Third, we estimate our cost model insert-
ing a term that reﬂects the possible impact of environmental expenditures on non-environmental
production. Under the null hypothesis that reported environmental expenditures accurately reﬂect
costs, the coefﬁcient on this term should be zero. Our approach differs from previous work with
similar data by using a cost-function modeling approach that distinguishes the production of envi-
ronmental services and conventional output, by considering a larger number of industries, and by
paying particular attention to plant-speciﬁc effects.
Our main results, based on four large, heavily regulated industries, indicate large but statis-
tically insigniﬁcant variability across industrial sectors. We ﬁnd that reported environmental ex-
penditures tend to generate offsetting savings in some industries and added burdens in others.
However, none of the estimated offsets is statistically signiﬁcant from zero. Using our preferred
ﬁxed-effects model, a weighted average of the four industries yields a best estimate of aggregate
savings in conventional production costs of eighteen cents for every dollar of reported incremental
pollution control expenditures, with a standard error of forty-two cents. This is equivalent to say-
ing that total production costs rise by eighty-two cents (one dollar minus eighteen cents) for every
dollar of reported environmental expenditures. Estimates based on an alternative, pooled model
consistently show smaller savings and larger additional burdens than the ﬁxed-effects model. Al-
though the higher, pooled estimates are more consistent with previous work, we believe they are
biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants.
In the remainder of the paper, we ﬁrst review the literature surrounding cost estimates of envi-
ronmental protection. We then present an industry level model of plant behavior in the presence
of environmental regulation using a cost function approach. In Section 4 we discuss the estima-
tion of this cost function and use the results to compute the marginal cost associated with reported
environmental expenditures. Section 5 offers a set of concluding observations. Details concerning
construction of the dataset and estimation of the model parameters are contained in the Appendix.
32 Background
2.1 Distinguishing Reported Expenditures and Economic Costs
The key issue addressed in this paper is the possible gap between the true cost of environmental
regulation and readily available, self-reported expenditure estimates. To obtain an accurate mea-
sure of true economic cost, one can imagine plant managers providing accurate responses to the
following (hypothetical) question:
“Identify the increase in costs associated with your efforts to reduce environmental
emissions or discharges fromyour facility. In preparingyour estimates, be sureto con-
sider the extent to which environmental activities : (a) involve direct outlays of capital
and operating costs; (b) reduce other (i.e., non-environmental) capital and operating
costs; (c) lead to cost-saving innovations; (d) affect operatingﬂexibility; (e) crowdout
non-environmental investments; or (f) discourage purchase of new equipment because
of differential performance requirements for new versus existing equipment. Include
estimates of the plant managers’ time and other overhead items associated with these
activities. Exclude expenditures related to occupational health and safety. When pro-
cess changes (as opposed to end-of-thepipe additions) are involved, allocate only that
portion of the costs attributable to environmental protection.”
Of course fewﬁrmspossess the informationto reliablyanswer such acomplex and comprehen-
sive question. Instead, we have at our disposal the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures
(PACE) Survey. Collected by the U.S. Census Bureau in most years 1973-1994, the PACE ques-
tionnaire asks a sample of manufacturing plants to provide information on capital and operating
expenditures, including depreciation, labor, materials, energy and other inputs – essentially item
(a) of our hypothetical question.5
PACE results have been regularly published by Census and represent, by far, the most compre-
hensive source of information on environmental expenditures. They form the basis of calculations
that annualized environmental costs exceed $150 billion (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
5The Census Bureau ceased collecting PACE in 1994 for budgetary reasons. The PACE questionnaire asks plant
managers how expenditures compare to what they would have been in the absence of environmental regulation. This
raises the issue of the appropriate baseline. Absent regulation, ﬁrms might still engage in some pollution control to
limittortliability,maintaingoodrelationswithcommunities in whichthey are located, maintaina goodenvironmental
image, and otherreasons. However, itis unclear whether survey respondents are able todetermine what environmental
expenditures would have been made in the absence of regulation.
41990).6 PACE data have been used as inputs in dynamic general equilibrium analyses to estimate
the long-run consequences of environmental regulation. These results indicate social costs which
are from 30 to 50 percent higher than reported annual expenditures (Hazilla and Kopp 1990; Jor-
genson and Wilcoxen 1990). PACE data have also been used to analyze the decline in productivity
growth observed during the 1970’s. For example, researchers have found that environmental regu-
lations accounted for 8 to 44 percent of the declines in total factor productivity observed in various
industries (U.S. Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment 1994).
Despite thebroad use of PACE data and the widespread presumption that it measures economic
costs, numerous issues distinguish PACE data from true economic costs. When ﬁrms report oper-
ating expenses, for example, it is unclear how they handle management time and other overhead
items. As discussed by Noreen and Soderstrom (1994), treating overhead as either completely
variable or completely ﬁxed is generally wrong – leading to over- or understatement of costs, re-
spectively. Various studies also suggest that responses to items (d-f) in the hypothetical question
would likely raise estimates of costs above those implied by the expenditure data alone (for ex-
cellent surveys, see Jaffee, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins 1995; Schmalensee 1993). There is
some evidence, for example, that environmental investments may crowd out other investments by
ﬁrms (Rose 1983). Further, many environmental regulations mandate stringent standards for new
plants but effectively exempt older ones from requirements. This new source bias may discour-
age investment in new, more efﬁcient facilities and thereby raise production costs (Gruenspecht
1982; Nelson, Tietenberg, and Donihue 1993). It has also been suggested that pollution control
requirements may reduce operating ﬂexibility which, in turn, could also lead to higher costs (Joshi
et al. 1997). Industry estimates of pollution control expenditures, using broader deﬁnitions of cost
than those used by the Census Bureau, routinely generate higher estimates. One recent industry
estimate was almost double the PACE number (American Petroleum Institute 1996).
6The EPA estimates are somewhat higher than those developed by Census Bureau largely because: 1) EPA annu-
alizes investment outlays (at a 7 percent discount rate) rather than directly reporting annual expenditures; and 2) the
EPA data includes some programs not covered by Census, e.g., drinkingwater and Superfund.
52.2 The Potential for Overstatement
In contrast to items (d-f), (b) and (c) in the hypothetical survey question represent a very different
line of thinking. Item (b) addresses the argument that potential complementarities between con-
ventional productionand environmentalexpendituresmay offsetpartof thereportedenvironmental
expenditures. Especially when process changes are involved (as opposed to end-of-the-pipe treat-
ment), the cost of jointly producing both conventional output and a cleaner environment may be
lower than the cost of producing them separately. Such complentarities might arise, for example,
from cost savings associated with recovered or recycled efﬂuents. The PACE survey has attempted
to estimate these so-called offsets but they are among the items thought to be most subject to
measurement error (Streitweiser 1996).
Another complementarity story arises when the costs of shutting down a production line are
substantial. Once it becomes necessary to stop production in order to make environmentally mo-
tivated modiﬁcations, it is only natural that other, non-environmentally motivated projects might
also be undertaken. This “harvesting” of non-environmental projects alongside necessary environ-
mental ones reduces the expenses associated the non-environmental projects, leading to a comple-
mentarity.
Item (c) represents the notion that environmental requirements may stimulate plant managers
to innovate and thus may offset some of the added costs associated with environmental protection.
The underlying argument has its roots in the work of Leibenstein (1966) and others who have writ-
ten about suboptimal ﬁrm behavior. The application to environmental issues goes back at least to
Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985). The most recent discussion is associated with Porter (1991)
who claims that “environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than
fully offset the costs of complying with them” (Porterand Van der Linde 1995). In effect, the argu-
ment is that the complementarities between environmental activities and conventional production
(item b) combined with the induced innovations associated with environmental requirements (item
c) may actually exceed the direct expenditures associated with environmental protection (item a).
The empiricalbasis for assessing these claimsis quitelimited. Astudy by Meyer (1993),which
6examines whether states with strict environmental laws demonstrate poor economic performance
relative to states with more lax standards, is frequently cited in support of the Porter hypothesis.
Althought the study found that states with stricter laws actually performed better, the paper sheds
littlelight on a possible causal relationship between regulation and economic performancebecause
it does not control for many of the factorsrelevant to a state’s economic performance. Various case
studies of particular plants have been conducted but problems of selection bias make it impossible
to generalize from the results (Palmer, Oates, and Portney 1995).
Most economists have been unsympathetic to Porter’s arguments because they depend on the
assumption that ﬁrms consistently ignore or are ignorant of proﬁtable opportunities, including the
use of innovativetechnologies(Palmer and Simpson 1993). This skepticism does not precludespe-
ciﬁc instances where government regulations may lead to cost savings, e.g., the well-known case
of controlson vinyl chlorideemissions (Doniger 1978). Alternatively, othershave conjectured that
environmental regulation could have the effect of lowering costs – at least at the industry level – by
forcingexceptionally inefﬁcientplantsto close and therebyexpanding productionat the remaining,
more efﬁcient facilities (U.S. Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment 1980). Still, these examples are
generally regarded as special cases and considered atypical of behavior in a competitive economy.
2.3 Empirical Studies of PACE Data
Actual plant-level responses to our hypothetical survey question would enable researchers to mea-
sure the relative importance of the various, often countervailing inﬂuences. Absent such detailed,
data, we can only estimate the net effect based on available PACE and Census information. Sev-
eral other papers have also attempted to do this. Work by Gray (1987) and Gray and Shadbegian
(1994) explored these issues in the context of growth accounting. Using a straightforward model
where environmental activities are entirely separate from conventional production, they show that
a 1% increase in the ratio of environmental expenditures to total costs should lead to a 1% fall
in measured total factor productivity. Any deviation from this one-for-one relation indicates joint
production; in their terminology, productivity effects. Their results indicate a more than one-for-
7one fall in measured productivity, suggesting that the cost of regulation is understated by reported
environmental expenditures. In the steel industry, for example, they ﬁnd a $3.28 increase in total
costs for every additional dollar of environmental expenditure.
Similar work by Joshi, Lave, Shih, and McMichael (1997) (hereafter, JLSM) focuses on the
steel industry over the period 1979-88. JLSM distinguish between the direct effects of regulation
(i.e., thereportedabatementexpenditures)andthe indirecteffectsreﬂectingany differencebetween
reported expenditures and changes in total production cost.7 JLSM estimate a cost function in
which pollution abatement expenditures enter as a ﬁxed output, ﬁnding that the indirect effects of
regulation are large – on the order of $7-12 for each $1 in reported expenditures.
Our approach differs from previous work with similar data by considering a larger number of
industries, using a cost-function modeling approach that distinguishes the production of environ-
mental services and conventional output, and paying particular attention to plant-speciﬁc effects.
We prefer this method to the growth accounting framework of Gray and Shadbegian because it
more closely resembles the plant-level decision problem. Namely, prices are ﬁxed and the plant
seeks to minimize costs, making costs and factor inputs the endogenous quantities. The growth
accounting framework, in contrast, treats factor inputs as ﬁxed and output as the endogenous
variables.8
In contrast to JSLM, we adopt acost function approachthat allowsfor thepossibility of disjoint
environmental and non-environmental activities under our null hypothesis. Their joint modeling
approach, while ﬂexible, implicity rules out the possibility that environmental activities are unre-
lated to conventional production activities. By extension, this also eliminates the possibility that
reported environmental expenditures exactly measure true economic costs.9
We distinguish ourselves from both the Gray and Shadbegian and JSLM studies, however, in
7Gray (1987) refers to these indirect effects as the real effect of regulation.
8This assumes that productivityshocks are uncorrelated with factor inputs and that the scale of regulatory expen-
ditures depends on the level of inputs rather than the level of output.
9Bymodelingthelogoftotalcosts as a linearfunctionofthelogofreportedregulatoryexpenditure,itisimpossible
for the derivative of total cost with respect to regulatory expenditure to identicallyequal one in the JSLM framework.
The derivative in levels depends on the ratio of total costs divided by regulatory expense which varies across obser-
vations. We instead specify our relation in terms of the log of non-environmental production costs so that a zero
coefﬁcient on regulatory expense reﬂects complete separation of environmental and non-environmentalproduction.
8our treatment of differences among plants. While we are able to replicate their general results in
Section 4, we show that those results depend critically on strong assumptions about homogeneity
among plants.10 Speciﬁcally, they assume that differences in plant location, age and management
have no effect on either productivity or environmental expenditure – an assumption that seems
unlikely to be satisﬁed in practice. Allowing for such differences (by estimating a ﬁxed-effects
rather than a pooled model) substantially reduces the estimated economic cost associated with an
incremental dollar of reported expenditures. Our results, in fact, allow us to statistically reject the
hypothesis that the economic cost of an additional dollar of reported environmental expenditure is
much more than one dollar.
3M o d e l
The most transparent way to measure the relation between changes in total costs and changes in
reported PACE expenditures would be to focus on two identical groups of plants, one of which
is randomly subject to higher regulatory standards. Using this data we could simply examine the
difference in average non-environmental production costs between the two populations and then
compare it to the difference in average reported PACE expenditures. The ratio of the differences
would reveal the degree, if any, to which the reported PACE data over- or understates true costs.
Since the two groups would be otherwise identical (due to randomization), this would yield an
unbiased estimate of any potential savings or uncounted burdens.
In the absence of such a transparent, randomized experiment, we are forced to construct a
morecomplete model of production. This model must adequately account for other factorsbesides
regulation which affect costs. If we fail to do this, the inﬂuence of these factors may be falsely
attributed to regulation.
An important source of such confounding inﬂuence may be unobservable productivity differ-
ences among plants. These differences, which might be related to geographical location, man-
10Gray and Shadbegian report results allowing for plant heterogeneity but argue that they are more likely to be
affected by measurement error. As we discuss in Section B.2, this is not necessarily the case and, even if it were, there
are other compelling reasons to prefer the results allowingfor heterogeneity.
9agement style, age, or other plant characteristics, could inﬂuence the level of both environmental
and non-environmental expenditures. Simple pooling of the data to estimate the cost implications
of higher reported PACE expenditures without controlling for these differences would be equiva-
lent to asking what happens when regulatory expenditures change along with associated changes
plant location, management style and age. To the extent that we are interested in the economic
cost of higher environmental expenditures holding plant characteristics constant, this constitutes
an omitted-variable bias.
Since our data set contains multiple observations for each plant, we have the ability to con-
sider ﬁxed-effectsmodels which explicitly accomodate plant-level differencesin productivity. The
downside to this approach is that between-plant variation in costs will be ascribed to these ﬁxed
effects. Thus, the uncounted effects of more expensive regulation are estimated solely by exam-
ining changes in non-environmental expenditures over time associated with changes in reported
PACE expenditures over time. If there are, in fact, no productivity differences among plants, this
approach leads to unnecessarily noisier and less efﬁcient parameter estimates. This potential loss
of efﬁciency is the cost of protecting ourselves against omitted-variable bias.
3.1 General Approach
Our analytic approach involves three distinct steps. First, we distinguish between environmental
abatement expenditures and non-environmental production expenditures. This distinction allows
us to consider the null hypothesis that conventional, non-environmental production expenditures
are unaffected by PACE activities. Second, we model the production of both environmental ser-
vices and conventional output as distinct cost minimization problems and derive expressions for
the resulting cost and factor input shares. Third, we estimate our cost model inserting a term that
reﬂects the possible impact of environmental expenditures on non-environmental production. If
regulatory efforts and conventional production are, in fact, distinct, this term will not be statis-
tically signiﬁcant and we would conclude that reported environmental expenditures are a good
assessment of the true costs. Conversely, if the inserted environmental expenditure variable is sig-
10niﬁcant, then one would conclude that reported environmental expenditures are not an accurate
measure of the cost of environmental regulation.
Estimation of our cost model is complicated by two data limitations: We cannot separate ob-
served factor inputs into those used for abatement efforts and those used for conventional produc-
tions. Also, we do not observe a “level” of environmental output. These limitations lead us to
make stronger identifying assumptions but do not fundamentally hinder our approach.
The ﬁrst step, separating total expenditures into abatement effort and conventional production,
allows us to focus squarely on the hypothesis of interest. Under the null hypothesis that reported
environmental expenditures accurately reﬂect the cost of environmental regulation, the remaining
expenditures on conventional production should be completely determined by the level of conven-
tional output, prices of inputs, a time trend, and possible idiosyncratic differences among plants.
This leads to the second step, where we derive distinct expressions for expenditures on both
conventional production and abatement based on cost minimizing behavior by plants. By adopting
a structural approach, with model parameters representing technological constraints rather than
simple correlations in the data, we have greater conﬁdence that the parameters are invariant to
changes in regulatory policy. Our cost function approach also assumes output and prices are ex-
ogenous. The plant then chooses the cost-minimizing combination of endogenous inputs. This, in
turn, determines expenditures on abatement and conventional output.
Our cost function approach has two advantages over conventional production function ap-
proaches, which instead treats inputs as exogenous and outputs as endogenous. First, we avoid
regressing output on regulatory expenditure which may be biased if the scale of output inﬂuences
regulatory costs.11 Second, we take advantage of the ﬁrst order conditions for cost minimization
to impose additional restrictions on our parameters and improve estimation efﬁciency.
The third step of our analysis allows for potential economies of scope.12 Speciﬁcally, we in-
sert regulatory expenditures into our model of conventional, non-environmental production costs.
11Gray and Shadbegian (1994), for example, ﬁnd that scaling abatement expenditures by output tends to bias their
cost estimates upward.
12See Bailey and Friedlaender (1982).
11This gives us an idea, loosely speaking, of the possible complementarities involved in the joint
production of conventional output and environmental activities. To the extent that environmental
activities are completely disjoint from regular production, the coefﬁcient on regulatory expendi-
tureswill be zero. In that case, themarginal economiccost of an additionaldollar of environmental
expenditures will be entirely reﬂected by environmental expenditures alone and will exactly equal
one dollar.
If, however, environmental expenditures somehow complement conventional production, the
marginal cost could be less than a dollar. As noted, such complementarities might arise from
process changes which were almost proﬁtable even without environmental considerations, from
beneﬁts associated with recovered and recycled efﬂuents, or from unforeseen spillovers caused
by regulatory activities. Alternatively, such efforts might impose additional, uncounted costs. The
possiblecrowdingout ofproductiveinvestments, higheradministrativecosts, andlossof ﬂexibility,
for example, are presumably not counted in the measure of reported regulatory expenditures and
could lead to a marginal economic cost exceeding one dollar.
3.2 Speciﬁcation
We now explain the key technical aspects of our model. In each period t we assume each plant i
wishes to minimize the cost associated with producing a given quantity of conventional output Y .
The function Fi;t() deﬁnes a production technology involving Y coupled with inputs of capital,
labor, energy, and materials. In particular, Fi;t()=0is the production frontier and Fi;t() < 0
describes feasible but inefﬁcient input/output combinations.13 The production function is indexed
over both plants i and time t to allow for exogenous time trends in productivity as well as differ-
ences between plants.
13That is, given any feasible production combination it is always possible to use more inputs or produce fewer
outputs by simply discarding the excess. However, unless some prices are zero this will not be efﬁcient.
12The cost minimization performed by the plant is given by:
PC =m i n
K;L;E;M
PkK + PlL + PeE + PmM
such that Fi;t(Y;K;L;E;M)  0with Y ﬁxed,
(1)
where Pk, Pl, Pe,a n dP mrepresent prices of capital, labor, energy and materials, respectively, and
PCis the production cost associated with Y .
The minimization in (1) deﬁnes a cost function PC = G i;t(Y;Pk;P l;P e;P m). 14 We specify
the cost function to be of the translog functional form:15
log(PC)= i+
0




0xX + r logR (2)
where X = flogY;logPk;logPl;logPe;logPm;tg 0,  i;x = fy; i;k; i;l; i;e; i;m; tg 0,  x =
h
 y  k  l  e  m  t
i
, y =f yy; yk; yl; ye; ym; ytg0,e t c . ,a n dRis regulatory expenditure.
Note that we have assumed that plant differences as well as a time trend may change overall pro-
ductivity and bias the factor shares (see factor share equations below). We have also added a term
(r logR) reﬂecting the possible inﬂuence of regulatory expenditures on conventional production
costs. Our null hypothesis is that the coefﬁcient r should be zero and that reported regulatory ex-
penditures accurately reﬂect the cost of environmental regulation. That is, PACE activities should
have no effect on non-environmental production costs.
Taking the ﬁrst derivativesof this log cost functionwith respect to log prices yieldsexpressions
for the associated factor shares by Shepard’s Lemma:
vk;y = i;k + 
0
kX
vl;y = i;l + 
0
lX
ve;y = i;e + 
0
eX
vm;y = i;m + 
0
mX
where vk;y, vl;y, ve;y and vm;y are the input cost shares for capital, labor, energy and materials,
14For a general discussion of cost functions see Varian (1992).
15See Diewert and Wales (1987) for a discussion of the translog and other ﬂexible functionalforms.
13respectively, associated with producing Y units of output, and k = fky; kk; kl; ke; km; ktg0,
etc. As noted above, our speciﬁcation allows for plant speciﬁc differences in factor demand.16
Normally, we would proceed with the simultaneous estimation of both the cost function (2)
and the share equations. However, the cost shares associated with Y production costs (vk;y, vl;y,
etc.) are not, in fact, observed. Instead, we observe the cost shares associated with both production
costs and abatement costs. These “aggregate”cost sharesare aweighted average of productionand
abatement cost shares. The aggregate cost shares will not equal the production cost shares except
under the very restrictive assumption that the technology for producting output Y and abatement
are almost identical.
To work around this difﬁculty, we specify cost share relations for regulatory costs:
vk;r = γk + 
0
kZ
vl;r = γl + 
0
lZ
ve;r = γe + 
0
eZ
vm;r = γm + 
0
mZ
where vk;r, vl;r, ve;r and vm;r are the input cost shares associated with regulatory costs for capital,
labor, energy and materials, respectively, Z = flogPk;logPl;logPe;logPm;tg 0,fγ k;γ l;γ e;γ mg
are constants, and k = fkk; kl; ke; km; ktg0, etc. Because we are unable to observe an output
measure associated with regulatory efforts (analogous to Y ) we cannot estimate a corresponding
cost function for regulatory costs.17 We are also forced to ignore potential factor biases associated
with the scale of regulatory activity.
16The number of ﬁxed effects being estimated raises the issue of whether the remaining model parameters can be
consistently estimated – an incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott 1948). Chamberlain (1980) has shown
that maximizing the likelihood conditional on statistics that are sufﬁcient for the incidental parameters avoids this
problem. Cornwell and Schmidt (1992) show that the conditional and unconditional MLEs coincide for a system of
equations with ﬁxed effects, proving the consistency of MLE in this case. Our model deviates slightly from their
model because we include ﬁxed effects interacted with inputprices inthe cost function. This does not, however, affect
the consistency of the remaining parameter estimates.
17Without a measure of regulatory effort we have no way to explain the scale of regulatory costs.





























where R are regulatory costs and PC are production costs, can now be estimated alongside the
production cost function. To be consistent with economic theory, we impose symmetry (ij =
ji; ij = ji)and homogeneity of degree one on prices. That is, a doubling of prices doubles total
costs.
One of these four share equations is redundant by the price homogeneity restrictions and is
therefore dropped from the estimation procedure.18 We add a vector of normal, independent and
identically distributed stochastic disturbances to the cost function plus three share equations and
estimate the following system (now explicitly indexed over plants and time): 19






































3.3 Accounting for Plant-Level Differences
The model given in (3) is an extremely ﬂexible speciﬁcation of plant-level technology. By allow-
ing the parameters i and i;x to vary among plants (indexed by i), it is possible that two plants
18We omit the share equation for materials and express all nominal quantities as ratios with respect to the price of
materials. However, the estimated parameters are invariant to the choice of which equation is omitted. For a complete
discussion of translog cost functionestimation, see discussion in Berndt (1990), Chapter 9.4.
19We allow for contemporaneous correlation of the disturbance, e.g., between 1;i;t and 2;i;t. Note, however, that
the disturbance in the unspeciﬁed R cost function must be uncorrelated with  in order for the parameter estimates to
be unbiased (since R occurs in the production cost function). This is reasonable if we view the environmental cost
minimization as occuring before the non-environmental cost minimization.
15Figure 1: Fixed Effects versus Pooled Estimatora

















































aThis is a stylized representation of the model given in Equa-
tion (2). It emphasizes the role of ﬁxed effects but ignores other
covariates besides regulation as well as the log-logspeciﬁcation.
producing the same amount of output and facing the same input prices may have different produc-
tion costs and may use different combinations of inputs. Requiring some of these parameters to be
similar across plants then allows us to explore more restrictive models.
We could assume, for example, that there is no variation in any of the ’s across plants. That
would be the case if all plants shared exactly the same production technology. Under this assump-
tion, we could estimate the model by simply pooling the data and ignoring the panel structure (i.e.,
multiple observations for each plant).
To estimate the full model, we takeadvantage of the panel structureof thedata, allowthe ’s to
differ and estimate them along with the other parameters. We do this by adding dummy variables
for each plant in both the cost function and share equations and otherwise following the same
procedure as before.20
Figure 1 illustrates the potential discrepancy between these assumptions. Consider data from
two plants with six observations of production costs and regulatory expenditures for each. As
20The dummy variables appearing the share equations also appear in the cost function interacted with the corre-
sponding prices.
16drawn, there is a negligibleeffect of rising regulation on production costs for both plant 1 (denoted
by ) and plant 2 (denoted by ) viewed separately. If we view each plant separately – but require
increased environmental expenditures to have the same incremental effect – it would appear that
there is a roughly $0.20 decrease in production costs for every $1 increase in regulation. That is,
costs are overstated by reported expenditures. This is the ﬁxed-effects estimate.
However, plant 1 has, on average, $0.50 more regulation than plant 2 and, on average, $1
more production costs – an increase of $2 in production costs per dollar of regulation. Pooling
the data, in effect averaging the zero-for-one ﬁxed-effects relation with this two-for-one relation,
we estimate a pooled slope coefﬁcient of 1.5. That is, based on the pooled estimate, costs are
substantially understated by reported expenditures (by nearly 150%).
If there was no discrepancy between these two relations – that is, the relation among plant
means versus the relation among observations for each plant – then the ﬁxed-effects and pooled
slope estimates would be roughly the same. Visually, the data points in Figure 1 would lie along
the same (dotted) line, rather than along two different (solid) lines. In this scenario, the pooled
estimator would be preferred since it uses more information (the relation between plant means)
than the ﬁxed-effects estimator. This is especially important if there is more variation between
plants than within plants, as is usually the case.21
When thereis adiscrepancy, as illustrated inFigure1 and as we ﬁndin our data, it is not imme-
diately obvious which of the two slope estimates – the ﬁxed-effects or the pooled – is preferred.22
If we believe that the differences between plants are actually caused by differences in regulation,
then the pooled estimator is appropriate. Suppose, for example, that both regulatory expenditures
and total costs differ by plant location. In such a scenario, ﬁrms might only be willing to select
locations with higher regulatory expenditures if the other costs at that location were lower, at least
partially offsetting the higher regulatory costs. In that case, we might be interested in a slope
coefﬁcient which included the indirect effect of higher regulation on total cost via the choice of
21See Table 2 in Gray and Shadbegian (1994).
22We statistically reject the hypothesis that the intercepts are the same in every industryand at any reasonable level
of signiﬁcance. See discussion in Appendix B.
17plant location. This would correspond to the pooled estimate, where variation between plants, e.g.,
location, is used to identify the effect of regulation. The ﬁxed-effect estimate, in contrast, ignores
this variation by controlling for all ﬁxed (i.e., time invariant) differences among plants. In light of
this distinction, we might view the pooled estimate, which allows plant characteristics to change,
as a long-run elasticity and the ﬁxed-effects estimate, which holds constant differences between
plants, as a short-run elasticity.23
There are three reasons why this scenario where regulation causes plant differences is inappro-
priate and why we instead prefer the ﬁxed-effects model. First, it seems that there are many more
plant characteristics which are likely to inﬂuence regulatory costs rather than be inﬂuenced by it.
If ﬁrms choose their plant locations without regard for regulatory costs, even though regulatory
differences exist, it would be incorrect to compute an estimator which insinuated that regulation
affects location, rather than the other way around.24 Considering characteristics like age and man-
agement style, it becomes even more apparent that plant differences in regulatory expenditure are
more likely to be an effect than a cause of other plant differences. If environmental expenditures
are, in fact, affected by factors like plant age, location and management, the pooled estimator will
suffer from omitted-variablebias while the ﬁxed-effects estimator will remain unbiased.
The second reason for preferring the ﬁxed-effects model is an empirical one. As discussed in
Section 4, the pooled estimates are uniformly larger than the ﬁxed-effects estimates (as depicted
in Figure 1). If the purpose of the pooled estimator is to capture the increased ﬂexibility over the
long run, the pooled slope estimate should instead be smaller. Thus, there are empirical reasons to
reject the pooled results.
Finally, even if we decide to estimate a regulatory effect which includes effects transmitted via
differencesin plantcharacteristics, it wouldbeinappropriateto simplypool thedataasdescribed.25
23Caves, Christensen, Tretheway, and Windle(1985)use thisdistinctiontodifferentiatereturnstoscale from returns
to density in the U.S. railroad industry. Assuming the track network used by ﬁrms is ﬁxed over time, they use a ﬁxed-
effects modeltoestimatereturntodensity,holdingnetworkﬁxed, anda random-effects(e.g., pooled)modeltoestimate
return to scale, allowing network size to vary.
24Bartik (1988), Bartik (1989), Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992), Levinson (1992) and McConnell and
Schwab (1990) all ﬁnd small or insigniﬁcanteffects of regulation on plant location.
25That is because differences in regulatory expenditures are unlikely to explain all the differences among plants,
leaving a random, unexplained difference in cost which is common among the observations of a given plant. The pa-
18Instead, a random-effects model would be appropriate (Mundlak 1978). The random-effects es-
timator, however, continues to suffer from the ﬁrst two criticisms, i.e., omitted variable bias and
empirical incongruity with theory, again recommending the ﬁxed-effects approach.26
4 Measuring the Cost of Environmental Expenditures
To determine the relationship between environmental expenditures and actual cost we estimate the
cost function and share equations derived in the previous section. The measure that concerns us –
the potential inﬂuence of environmental expenditures on non-environmental production costs – is
then determined from the estimated parameters.
In particular, the parameter r measures the elasticity of non-environmental production costs
with respect to reported environmental expenditures. Multiplying this estimated elasticity by the
ratio of non-environmental costs to environmental expenditures for a particular plant reveals the
dollar change in non-environmental costs for a dollar change in reported environmental expendi-
tures. We refer to this quantity as the non-environmental cost offset. Adding one to this number
reveals the dollar change in total costs (environmental + non-environmental) for a dollar change
in reported environmental costs. We refer to this quantity as the marginal cost of reported environ-
mental expenditures.
The cost function and share equations given in (3) are estimated using maximum likelihood.
The resulting parameter estimates are reported in Table B.2 and described in Appendix B. It is
interesting to note that while just over half of the estimated parameters are signiﬁcantly different
from zero, r is signiﬁcant in only one of the eleven industries.27 This immediately suggests that
there will be little evidence supporting the hypotheses of either understatement or overstatement
of regulatory costs.
rameter i in thiscase wouldbe a randomly distributedvariable. While a simple pooled estimator wouldbe consistent
and unbiased, it would not be efﬁcient nor would the standard errors be correct.
26There are potentially two opposing econometric reasons one might prefer the random-effects model over the
ﬁxed-effect model – measurement error and endogeneity. This is discussed in Appendix B.2.
27The results in the one signiﬁcant industry, motor vehicles, are questionable based on the unrealistically large
estimate of $25 in additional, uncounted costs for every dollar of reported costs.
19These results also indicate that our ﬂexible modeling approach captures signiﬁcant features of
the data. Tests that the ﬁxed effectsin each equation are zero, for example, are strongly rejected by
likelihoodratiotests.28 Therefore, alternativeapproaches which assume a simplerrelation between
regulation and total costs may be misspeciﬁed.
4.1 Marginal Regulatory Cost
Weexaminetheconnectionbetween environmentalexpendituresand totalcostsintermsofmarginal
changes around the observed level of expenditures. In other words, we estimate the associated
change in total costs if current reported environmental expenditures rise by one dollar. An al-
ternative and different question is what fraction of existing reported expenditures actually reﬂect
existing economic costs – an average cost measure. Unfortunately,this is a morecomplex question
because it requires us to determine the relationship between reported expenditures and economic
costs, not only over the range of expenditures which we observe in the data, but all the way back
to zero expenditures. Such an extrapolation would not be credible. We do believe, however, that a
marginal cost considerably higher or lower than one would suggest a similar directional effect for
the average cost relation.
To calculate marginal cost, we differentiate the cost function in Equation (2) with respect to
regulatory expendituresR. This yieldsan estimate of non-environmentaloffset, O, associated with







where PC is non-environmental production cost, R is regulatory expenditure, and r is a param-
eter estimate from the cost function in Equation (2). Intuitively, this measure reveals the degree to
whichadditionalenvironmentalexpendituresaffectnon-environmentalexpenditures. Ifthisderiva-
tive is near zero, increases in reported expenditures are, in fact, a good measure of the additional
economic burden of further regulation. If the derivative is not equal to zero, such expenditures
28In each test, we compare the difference in the maximized log-likelihood between the pooled and ﬁxed effects
models, multipliedby two, to a chi-squared distributionwith 4(n − 1) degrees of freedom, where n is the number of
ﬁrms in the sample and 4(n − 1) is the number of additionalrestriction imposed by the pooled model.
20misrepresent incremental costs, with offset values greater than zero indicating an understatement
of true costs and offset values less than zero an overstatement.
Using O, we can also compute marginal costs MC = @(PC+R)=@R =1+O . That is, the
change in total costs associated with a change in reported regulatory expenditure. This measure
is useful because it summarizes the true cost associated with an incremental dollar of reported
environmental expense.
Since the value of O computed in (4) depends on observation speciﬁc values of PC and R,
these offset measures will vary from observation to observation. In order to compute an aggregate
answer, summarizing the offset at the industry or sectoral level, we have to make assumptions
about how to weight these different values. Conceptually, we are deciding how an increase in ag-
gregate regulatory expenditures would likely be allocated among ﬁrms in the sample. We could
compute a simple arithmetic average over all the observations. However, this would amount to
dividing up additional expenditures evenly among all observations – even though some plants cur-
rently have much lower regulatory expendituresthan others. A moreplausiblealternativewould be
to consider the aggregate offset of raising environmental expenditures across plants in proportion
to each plant’scurrent expenditures.29 That is, plants withsmall expenditures wouldhave small in-
creases and plants with large expenditures would have large increases. Such a calculation involves










Aggregate marginal cost then equals one plus the computed value of Oagg.
21Table 1: Offset Estimates – Large Expenditure Industries


























































# of obs. 615 404 717 536
À
ﬁxed –0.36 –0.80 –0.22 0.41 –0.18
effect (0.26) (0.56) (0.76) (0.42) (0.42)
Á
pooled –0.03 –0.33 2.47 2.28 1.73
(0.23) (0.49) (0.62) (0.33) (0.34)
weighty 0.130 0.089 0.430 0.166 0.816
yRatio of expenditures in each industry to eleven-
industrytotal. Thisweightisusedtocomputecross-industry
averages. See footnote 31 in the text concerning calculation
of the weights.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
224.2 Industry and ManufacturingSector Estimates
Tables 1 and 2 present estimates based on equation (5) of the offsetting effects of reported envi-
ronmental expenditures on nonenvironmental production costs, hereinafter referred to as nonenvi-
ronmental offsets. Multi-industry aggregates are shown in the last column(s). Table 1 focuses on
four industries with the largest share of regulatory expenditures – over 80% of our sample. These
four industriesalso yield themost stable estimates, as evidenced by relatively small standard errors
compared to the other seven industries. For both reasons we focus our initial discussion on these
results and return to the small expenditure industries in the next section.
The ﬁrst row of Table 1 presents the results allowing for plant-level, ﬁxed effects. While none
of the estimated nonenvironmental offsets is statistically different from zero, there is considerable
variation even among these four, relatively well-behaved industries. The estimate for the plastics
industry is that a one dollar increase in PACE expenditures leads to an 80 cent cost savings in
nonenvironmental production costs. For steel a one dollar increase in PACE expenditures leads to
an additional 41 cent cost increase in nonenvironmental production costs. Petroleum, which has
the largest share of reported regulatory expenditures, shows a twenty-two cent savings while pulp
and paper shows a thirty-six cent savings.
Even though these changes are not statistically signiﬁcant, they indicate a potential for envi-
ronmental expenditures to induce economically signiﬁcant savings offsets. The possibility of large
hidden costs, on the order of several times reported costs, is also ruled out. This result runs counter
to previous econometric studies.
In order to further aggregate the four large expenditure industry results into a single estimate,
we can again apply Equation (5). We use estimates of environmental spending by industry in
1994 – the most recent year available – to weight each industry’s marginal cost estimate.31 This
29This scheme preserves the computed elasticity r so it continues to reﬂect the aggregate, industry-levelelasticity.




i;tRi;t).H o w e v e r ,
we actually weight by real reported environmental expenditure, deﬂating by the GDP deﬂator. We do this so that
earlier years are not discounted simply because of inﬂation. This corresponds to multiplyingthe estimated elasticity
r by the ratio of real non-environmental production costs to real reported environmentalexpenditures, both summed
across all observations, rather than nominal values of each.
31 That is, we assume that incremental regulation is proportional to the level of reported expenditures in 1994 by
23approach yields an aggregate estimate of nonenvironmental offsets of eighteen cents for every
dollar of increased reported regulatory expenditures, with a standard error of forty-two cents.32
Thus, our best estimate of the economic cost of a dollar increase in PACE expenditures is only
eighty-two cents (one dollar minus eighteen cents). Based on a 95% conﬁdence interval, the true
economic cost ranges from negative two cents to positive $1.68. While this conﬁdence interval is
quite large, it again indicates that extremely large values (> $1:68), are unlikely.
In contrast to the ﬁrst row of estimates in Table 1 – which is based on the ﬁxed effects model
– the second row of estimates is based on a pooled model. Unlike the ﬁxed effects approach, the
pooled model assumes that the nonenvironmental offsets are completely explained by the included
right-hand side variables. This means that the effect of any omitted variables will be attributed to
the included right-hand side variables. This confounding of different effects potentially biases the
environmental offset estimates.
Interestingly, the pooled estimates are higher than the ﬁxed-effects estimates for all four indus-
tries, signiﬁcantly so in petroleum and steel. The (weighted) average environmental offset, driven
heavily by large increases in the petroleum and steel industries, rises to positive $1.73 per dollar of
PACE expenditures, with a standard errorof $0.34. Based on thispooled model, thetotal economic
costs of a marginal dollar of reported environmental expenditures is $2.73 ($1.00 plus $1.73). The
pooled estimate is not only much higher, it is also in line with previous estimates concerning the
cost of regulation. Joshi et al. (1997) report an estimate of $7-12 for the steel industry using a cost
function modeling approach. Based on a growth accounting model, Gray and Shadbegian (1994)
ﬁnd marginal costs of $1.74, $1.35 and $3.28 for paper mills, oil reﬁneries and steel mills, respec-
tively. Both studies pool their data, although Gray and Shadbegian (1994) also report results for a
ﬁxed-effects model that, like our ﬁxed-effects results, are uniformly lower.33
industry. Within each industry incremental regulation is allocated to each observation in our multi-year sample in
proportionto that observation’s real regulatory expenditure.
32Note that with a weight of 0:430=0:816,petroleum plays a key role in determining the aggregate estimate.
33$0.55, $0.97, and $2.76 for paper mill, oil reﬁneries and steel mills, respectively, all of which are insigniﬁcantly
different from both zero and one. They downplay these results based on the argument that measurement error is a
bigger problem for the ﬁxed-effect estimates than the pooled model. We disagree with this argument, as explained in
Section B.2.
24The implication of this comparison between the ﬁxed-effects and pooled models is striking.
Comparing differences among plants based on the pooled model, there appear to be additional
costs associated with environmental protection but not included in PACE. Going back to Figure 1,
this is analogously reﬂected by the pooled regression line which exhibits a positive slope. These
additional costs generate a more than dollar-for-dollar increase in total costs for any change in
reported environmental expenditures. However, such a comparison potentially ignores other im-
portantdifferenceswhich exist among plantsandwhich could confoundsuch ameasurement. Ifwe
instead control for these differences, estimate a ﬁxed-effects model, and examine how changes in
PACE expenditures for a given plant lead to changes in non-environmental costs for that plant, we
ﬁnd no evidence of a positive relationship. This is analogous to the ﬁxed-effects regression line in
Figure 1 which is almost ﬂat. In our view, controlling for these omitted variables provides a more
reliable measure of the true marginal cost. We therefore interpretthese results as an indication that
PACE expenditures, while generally accurate, may modestly overstate the cost of environmental
regulation.
4.3 Small Expenditure Industries
We summarize the results for small expenditure industries in Table 2. Only one industry in this
group (motor vehicles) accounts for more than 5% of total PACE expenditures in our group of
eleven industries. As a group all these small industries account for only 18% of reported environ-
mental expenditures in our group of eleven industries. The estimated nonenvironmental offsets for
individual industries, which range from −$9:80 to $25:32, exceed any plausible range one might
imagine to be accurate. Simultaneously, the standard errors are much higher – an average of $2.04
versus $0.42 for the large expenditure industries.
At the same time, these industries all have much smaller sample sizes compared to those in
Table 1. They also include industries, e.g., semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, which may not
yield to traditional production function modeling. In these industries, the assumption of a single,
fairly homogenous output is challenged by the variety of products. Individual plants may be more
25Table 2: Offset Estimates – Small Expenditure Industries







































































































































# of obs. 185 114 260 224 80 257 102
À
ﬁxed –2.38 1.71 1.86 –2.39 3.16 25.32 –9.80 8.32 1.39
effect (1.31) (3.17) (1.24) (1.93) (2.21) (5.85) (8.49) (2.04) (0.51)
Á
pooled –2.66 6.72 3.64 7.55 13.55 27.80 30.40 13.96 3.98
(1.27) (3.50) (1.38) (2.48) (3.59) (5.64) (7.80) (2.02) (0.46)
weighty 0.026 0.019 0.033 0.010 0.026 0.060 0.009 0.184
yRatio of expenditures in each industry to eleven-industry total. This weight is used to compute cross-
industryaverages. See footnote31 in the text concerning calculation of the weights.
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
differentiatedthan their common four-digitSICcode suggests. Such issues make our cost function
approach somewhat questionable when applied to these industries.
Another important distinction is between industries primarily investing in end-of-pipe treat-
ment versus those which rely more on process changes to comply with environmental regulation.
End-of-pipe expenditures, where pollution control occurs after the production process, are likely
to be much easier for plants to measure. In the case of process changes, where pollution con-
trol occurs by changing the mix of inputs or otherwise altering the productive process, it may be
difﬁcult to tease out the level of environmental expenditures compared to a no-regulation alter-
native. In particular, as the menu of manufacturing technologies changes in response to demand
for cleaner processes, with the dirtier alternatives being eliminated, there may be greater difﬁculty
estimating environmental expenditures relative to a zero regulation baseline. Since many of these
small expenditureindustriesare process-changeoriented, it is not surprising that thecorresponding
marginal cost estimates are more exotic.
26While it would have been reassuring to see results in the small expenditure industries parallel
those in the large expenditure industries, we ﬁnd two useful messages in Table 2. First, some
patterns remain: the pooled estimates remain higher than the ﬁxed-effects estimates for all but
one of the small expenditure industries (malt beverages), suggesting that omitted-variable bias
continuestobeaproblem. Second, thewide-rangingand implausibleestimatesmay bejust another
indicator of the poor quality of the underlying PACE data, only exacerbated by the small sample
size. This is consistent with the hypothesis that theremay not be a systematic relationship between
reported environmental expenditures and additional economic costs/savings in some industries.
5 Conclusion
Most previous analyses ﬁnd that reported environmental expenditures are likely to understate the
true economic cost of environmental protection. In contrast, our results rule out any signiﬁcant un-
derstatement and instead point to a modest though statistically insigniﬁcant overstatement.U s i n g
our preferred ﬁxed-effects model, we estimate an aggregate savings of eighteen cents in conven-
tional production costs for every dollar of reported incremental pollution control expenditureswith
a standard error of forty-two cents. This is equivalent to saying that a dollar increase in reported
environmental expenditures raises total (environmental + non-environmental) production costs by
eighty-two cents.
We observe economically large, though statistically insigniﬁcant, variation in our estimates
among industries. We ﬁnd that reported environmental expenditures tend to generate savings in
conventional production costs in the petroleum reﬁning, plastics, and pulp and paper industries. In
the iron and steel industry they generate added burdens. This variation could be viewed as a con-
sequence of acknowledged quality issues in the PACE data. Alternatively, the observed variation
might explain why some ﬁrms and/or industries may believe that PACE understates the truecost of
environmental protection even if, on average, PACE is roughly right or even overstates true costs.
An important ﬁnding in our work is that alternative assumptions about productivity differences
among plants produce vastly different estimates of economic costs. We ﬁnd that estimates based
27on an alternative, pooled model consistently show smaller savings and larger additional burdens
than the ﬁxed-effects model. Use of a pooled model generates an aggregate estimate of $2.73 in
higher costs for every additional dollar of reported regulatory expenditure – versus $0.82 for the
ﬁxed-effects model. In contrast to the ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation, the pooled speciﬁcation assumes
that unmodeled differences between plants (e.g., age, location, management style) are unrelated to
either total costs or reported environmental expenditures – or that environmental regulation causes
those differences. Although the higher, pooled estimates are more consistent with previous work,
we believe they are biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants.
Previous work that found substantial understatement of regulatory costs has leaned on several
explanationsof those results. Reducedﬂexibility,the crowdingout ofnew investments, newsource
bias orsimply poor accounting areall plausiblereasons why reportedcosts wouldunderstateactual
costs.
Our own observation of possible overstatement leans on two possible explanations: production
complementarities/economies of scope or, once again, poor accounting. A plausible complemen-
tarity story arises, for example, if shutting down a production line is a substantial expense. Then,
it makes sense that plant managers would undertake non-environmental modiﬁcations alongside
environmental ones in order to take advantage of the forced downtime. Since it is cheaper to do
the two modiﬁcations together rather than separately, this represents economies of scope. If the
cost of the downtime is entirely allocated to the environmental project, it would not be surprising
to ﬁnd savings in conventional production associated with the increased expense on environmental
activities.
While we ﬁnd no statistical evidence of either over- or understatement of the cost of environ-
mental regulation, the range of values included in a reasonable conﬁdence interval, from 100%
overstatement to 70% understatement, is economically signiﬁcant and deserves to be scrutinized
further. Based on these results, it is fair to say that the current emphasis on better measurement of
the beneﬁts associated with environmental protection ought to be balanced with greater attention
to uncertainties about costs.
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A Data Sources
The data used in this paper are drawn from several plant-level datasets developed by the U.S.
Census Bureau:
 The Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). This is a pooled, cross-section, time series
comprised of the establishment responses to the Annual Survey of Manufacture (ASM) and
the quinquennial Census of Manufactures (CM) for over 50,000 establishments in each year.
The LRD contains information on cost, outputs and inputs at the plant level. Detailed quan-
tity and expenditure information for energy consumption are only available up to 1981.
 The Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS). Collected by the Department of
Energy every three years beginning 1985, MECS contains detailed fuel consumption and
expenditure data by establishment.
 ThePollution Abatement Control Expenditure (PACE). This dataset includes pollutionabate-
ment investment spending and operatingexpendituresat theestablishment leveland has been
collected by the Census Bureau for most years between 1979 and 1991, except 1983 and
1987.
For 11 four-digitSIC industries, our analysis includes the years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1988, and
1991. Sample sizes are shown in Table A.1.
Data on input and output quantities and prices are constructed as follows:
 Output. Data on the total value of shipments, by individual product codes, are contained in
the LRD. We construct a divisia index of output price based on the corresponding producer
prices of different product obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics (Caves, Christensen,
and Diewert 1982a; Caves, Christensen, and Diewert 1982b). The quantity index is obtained
by dividing total value of shipments, adjusted for inventory, by this aggregate output price
index.
 Regulation. Data on (nominal) annual pollution abatement operating costs at the plant level
are from the annual Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditure (PACE) Survey. Operating
expenses for pollution abatement include depreciation on the pollution abatement capital.
Detailed data are available for the years 1979-1991, except 1983 and 1987. Real regulatory
expenditures are computed by deﬂating nominal pollution abatement operating costs by the
GDP deﬂator.
32Table A.1: Sample Size by Industry
Industry Plants Sample Size
Malt Beverage 45 185
Pulp and Paper 142 612
Printing 45 114






Motor Vehicles and Car Body 59 203
Aircraft Engine 29 102
 Capital Stock. The gross book value of the capital stock at the beginning of the year and new
capital expenditures each year are reported in the LRD. Gross book valueis used to compute
the capital stock in 1979.34 A perpetual inventory method (Christensen and Jorgenson 1969)
is then used to generate a real capital stock series covering the period 1980-1991 based on
the following formula:




where kt is the period t capital stock and It is new capital expenditure measured in current
dollars. The industry-speciﬁc economic depreciation rate () is from Hulten and Wykoff
(1981). The capital stock price indices (qt) for various industries are drawn from a dataset
developed by Bartelsman and Gray (1994).
 Service Price of Capital. The service price of capital is calculated using the Hall-Jorgenson
(1969) procedure. The service price of capital is given by:
pk(t) =[ q t − 1r t+qt −(qt −qt−1)+q tC t]




34Speciﬁcally, capital stock is initialized to 0.45 times the gross book value in 1979. This ratio is based on the
aggregate net asset to gross book value ratio computed in the steel industry where ﬁrm 10-Ks were available.
33pk(t) = service price of capital,
qt = price index of new capital equipment,
rt = after tax rate of return on capital (opportunity cost),
 = rate of economic depreciation,
Ct = effective property tax rate,
ut = effective corporate income tax rate,
zt = present value of allowed depreciation tax deductions on a dollar’s
investment over the life time of an asset,
kt = investment tax credit,
t = year.
We use the average yield on Moody’s “Baa” bonds for the after tax rate of return on capital.
The data on the tax policy variables are from Jorgenson and Yun (1991) and Jorgenson and
Landau (1993).
 Capital Costs. The capital costs were constructed as the product of the service price of
capital and the stock of capital.
 Labor. The quantity of labor is deﬁned as the number of production workers. The cost of
labor includes productionworkerwages plussupplemental labor cost (which accured to both
production workers and non-production workers) adjusted to reﬂect the production worker
share. The price of labor is deﬁned as the cost of production workers divided by the number
of production workers.
 Priceof Materials. Expendituredataon individualmaterialsarecollected onaﬁveyear cycle
by the Census of Manufacturers(CM). We derivea divisia index of the price of materials for
each plant for the years 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992. Estimates for intervening years are linearly
interpolated.
 Cost of Materials. We use reported total expenditures on materials and parts in the LRD to
calculate material costs.
 Price of Energy. Detaileddataontotal quantitiesconsumedandtotal expendituresonvarious
fuels were collected in LRD (through 1981) and MECS (1985, 88, 91). These data are used
to calculate the prices of individual fuels ($/Mbtu) paid by each plant. The individual fuels
include coal, natural gas, dfo, rfo, lpg and electricity. These fuels typically account for about
90 percent of total energy cost. The price of energy is computed as a divisia index of these
fuels.
 Cost of Energy The cost of energy is the summation of expenditures for the six individual
fuels.
34Table B.2: Estimation resultsa































































































































y 0.7864 0.7456 0.7731 0.8417 0.4647 0.6468 0.7137 0.7232 0.4602 0.7554 0.7712
(0.0293) (0.0278) (0.0679) (0.0356) (0.0462) (0.0383) (0.0300) (0.0252) (0.0927) (0.0214) (0.0463)
r –0.0167 –0.0109 0.0073 –0.0150 0.0247 –0.0026 0.0112 –0.0119 0.0347 0.0675 –0.0257
(0.0092) (0.0078) (0.0135) (0.0105) (0.0165) (0.0091) (0.0116) (0.0096) (0.0242) (0.0156) (0.0223)
t –0.0097 0.0109 0.0286 0.0124 0.0383 –0.0033 –0.0023 0.0024 –0.0409 –0.0122 0.0352
(0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0123) (0.0024) (0.0045)
kk 0.1020 0.1047 0.0425 0.0501 0.0660 0.0101 0.0693 0.0067 0.0618 0.0033 0.0829
(0.0155) (0.0172) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0018) (0.0073) (0.0049) (0.0937) (0.0036) (0.0191)
ll 0.0273 0.1055 0.0842 0.0684 0.1423 0.0141 0.0572 0.0744 0.3072 0.0274 0.1709
(0.0166) (0.0116) (0.0355) (0.0092) (0.0205) (0.0014) (0.0205) (0.0150) (0.0477) (0.0139) (0.0476)
ee 0.0180 0.0693 0.0093 –0.0140 0.0192 0.0112 0.0340 0.0084 0.0279 0.0009 0.0058
(0.0034) (0.0073) (0.0038) (0.0146) (0.0078) (0.0018) (0.0182) (0.0014) (0.0081) (0.0006) (0.0029)
yy –0.0678 –0.0215 0.2565 –0.0343 0.0603 0.0283 0.0432 –0.0292 0.1288 0.1553 0.0999
(0.0388) (0.0322) (0.0980) (0.0335) (0.0460) (0.0236) (0.0198) (0.0223) (0.0476) (0.0248) (0.0200)
tt –0.0012 0.0032 0.0004 –0.0006 –0.0007 –0.0036 0.0002 0.0041 –0.0034 –0.0105 –0.0056
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0017)
kl –0.0107 0.0053 0.0112 –0.0115 –0.0078 –0.0027 –0.0113 0.0168 –0.0323 –0.0132 –0.0285
(0.0105) (0.0095) (0.0101) (0.0074) (0.0103) (0.0007) (0.0083) (0.0051) (0.0442) (0.0047) (0.0219)
ke –0.0012 –0.0229 0.0009 0.0024 –0.0104 –0.0010 –0.0115 –0.0032 –0.0067 –0.0001 –0.0016
(0.0034) (0.0080) (0.0048) (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.0011) (0.0064) (0.0014) (0.0119) (0.0005) (0.0043)
ky 0.0048 0.0056 0.0060 –0.0393 –0.0259 –0.0110 –0.0442 –0.0180 –0.0238 –0.0093 –0.0144
(0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0177) (0.0012) (0.0064)
kt 0.0004 0.0020 0.0029 0.0013 0.0040 0.0014 0.0001 0.0021 0.0497 0.0023 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0067) (0.0004) (0.0013)
le 0.0072 –0.0159 0.0027 –0.0079 –0.0068 0.0000 0.0220 –0.0052 –0.0218 –0.0013 –0.0078
(0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0082) (0.0010) (0.0127) (0.0018) (0.0059) (0.0007) (0.0056)
ly –0.0031 –0.0477 –0.0294 –0.0299 –0.0731 –0.0051 0.0032 –0.0146 –0.0450 –0.0340 –0.0432
(0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0222) (0.0039) (0.0123) (0.0010) (0.0067) (0.0048) (0.0201) (0.0032) (0.0131)
lt –0.0008 –0.0025 –0.0099 –0.0022 –0.0067 0.0002 –0.0043 –0.0036 –0.0316 0.0010 –0.0121
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0061) (0.0009) (0.0024)
ey –0.0052 –0.0061 –0.0081 0.0063 –0.0084 –0.0081 –0.0134 –0.0065 –0.0070 –0.0024 –0.0105
(0.0014) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0088) (0.0051) (0.0015) (0.0080) (0.0006) (0.0033) (0.0002) (0.0015)
et –0.0001 –0.0013 –0.0002 0.0012 0.0020 –0.0001 –0.0003 0.0002 0.0028 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0003)
yt –0.0060 0.0040 –0.0001 0.0113 0.0124 –0.0020 –0.0002 –0.0031 –0.0045 –0.0146 0.0106
(0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0088) (0.0026) (0.0022)
35Table B.2: Estimation resultsa (continued)































































































































γk 0.8968 0.1296 1.0556 0.0832 –0.1918 0.0418 0.0922 0.7265 –8.0098 1.4184 4.8810
(0.4143) (0.1018) (0.5235) (0.0979) (0.2658) (0.0493) (0.0634) (0.3602) (2.1659) (0.3462) (0.9041)
γl 1.2120 0.1417 5.7061 0.4864 1.3077 0.0913 0.0655 2.9809 8.4050 0.2101 3.0846
(0.3285) (0.0745) (1.7722) (0.0802) (0.4664) (0.0271) (0.1410) (0.7965) (2.1530) (0.9009) (1.6987)
γe 0.0769 0.2281 0.2042 0.4369 0.3105 0.0192 –0.4629 –0.1840 –0.0905 0.2820 0.2519
(0.0913) (0.0791) (0.2763) (0.1854) (0.2062) (0.0349) (0.1700) (0.1056) (0.3224) (0.0508) (0.2201)
kk 0.1833 0.8884 3.3909 0.3402 1.5320 0.3015 0.4278 5.5208 12.5426 2.0054 –6.2041
(1.5393) (0.4830) (2.6223) (0.4753) (0.7347) (0.0946) (0.2151) (1.3693) (9.3539) (1.1609) (3.0151)
kl 1.9030 0.0100 –2.7094 0.0564 –0.3278 0.0348 –0.1817 –3.1469 –2.9619 1.0930 1.8625
(1.0765) (0.2620) (1.5152) (0.2881) (0.6966) (0.0386) (0.2587) (0.6583) (4.0159) (1.2555) (3.9295)
ke 0.0160 –0.1390 1.2362 0.2610 0.0054 0.1158 0.3625 0.9717 0.1633 –0.4050 –0.6694
(0.3295) (0.1900) (0.9237) (0.2590) (0.4071) (0.0534) (0.1811) (0.3732) (1.1747) (0.1525) (0.6523)
kt –0.0360 0.0011 –0.1320 0.0623 0.1164 –0.0031 –0.0099 –0.0794 –1.7104 –0.0491 0.8046
(0.0794) (0.0164) (0.1299) (0.0184) (0.0368) (0.0105) (0.0159) (0.0589) (0.5190) (0.0947) (0.2100)
ll 0.0787 –0.3325 –14.5991 –1.0411 –3.0608 –0.2667 1.4014 3.4572 –19.4742 –3.5754 –28.8300
(1.9911) (0.3182) (4.9492) (0.3346) (1.3563) (0.0989) (0.6246) (1.6408) (4.0775) (3.4818) (10.1941)
le 0.1147 –0.0890 –0.5959 0.3905 –0.1919 0.0116 –0.7759 –0.0527 0.3539 –0.1234 3.5142
(0.4749) (0.1332) (0.7843) (0.2105) (0.5300) (0.0372) (0.3666) (0.2197) (0.5547) (0.1874) (1.2508)
lt 0.1540 –0.0135 0.7632 0.0431 0.0163 0.0088 –0.0748 0.2831 1.6125 0.1938 1.1113
(0.0633) (0.0125) (0.3442) (0.0174) (0.0643) (0.0067) (0.0364) (0.1252) (0.4635) (0.2180) (0.4176)
ee 0.1641 0.3831 –0.6590 0.5664 0.8957 –0.1164 –0.5289 –0.2840 1.3083 1.1883 0.9118
(0.2947) (0.1548) (0.6229) (0.4880) (0.4269) (0.0655) (0.5056) (0.2821) (0.5362) (0.1988) (0.8036)
et –0.0272 –0.0228 –0.0362 –0.0699 –0.0103 –0.0083 0.0623 –0.0251 –0.1135 –0.0032 –0.1241
(0.0169) (0.0101) (0.0606) (0.0265) (0.0296) (0.0073) (0.0334) (0.0193) (0.0731) (0.0129) (0.0541)
observations 185 615 114 404 260 717 536 224 80 257 102
ﬁrms 45 142 45 107 73 165 128 76 28 59 29
R2 total costs 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99
R2 capital share 0.70 0.80 0.98 0.81 0.85 0.75 0.80 0.90 0.88 0.75 0.87
R2 labor share 0.86 0.84 0.93 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.96 0.87 0.85 0.94
R2 energy share 0.81 0.87 0.92 0.70 0.76 0.87 0.49 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.93
log-likelihood 1951 5107 1280 3316 1964 7953 3699 2818 644 3278 1094
vs pooledb 449 1831 530 1155 844 1910 1186 931 263 640 401
vs C-D (PC) c 37 103 11 40 42 83 51 43 24 9 16
vs C-D (R)d 2 6 7 10 7 12 10 25 14 21 11
Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
aEstimation is based on maximum likelihood,iterating on the cross-equation covariance matrix untilit converges.
bPooled estimation assumes i =  8i in Equation (2). The value shown is the difference between log-likelihood
values and, when multipliedby two, is an asymptotically chi-squared test of this hypothesis, with degrees of freedom
equal to four times the number of plants minus one. This test rejects in all industries.
cC-D (PC) assumes kk = kl = ke = ll = le = ee =0(5% critical value is roughly6.3).
dC-D (R) assumes kk = kl = ke = ll = le = ee =0(5% critical value is roughly 6.3).
36B Estimation
Table B.2 presents detailed estimation results for the eleven industries considered in this study
using the ﬁxed-effects model discussed in Section 3.3. Parameter estimates for the 30 free slope
parameters in Equation (3), standard errors, goodness of ﬁt and likelihood statistics are reported.
The difference in the log-likelihood relative to three alternative models is also provided.
Over half of the estimated parameters are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Many of the second order
price coefﬁcients are among the signiﬁcant parameter estimates, both for the conventional produc-
tion function () and the environmental abatement cost function (). It should not be surprising,
then, that thetests of unit elasticityof substitution arerejectedtwenty-oneout of twenty-twotimes.
The test that the model reduces to a pooled form, where all the ﬁxed effects are the same, is
also strongly rejected. In every industry the test difference in likelihoods is on the order of ten
times the number of ﬁrms, whereas the critical value is on the order of four times the number of
ﬁrms, divided by two.
These tests suggest that the ﬂexible functional form being estimated cannot be reduced in a
substantial waywithout signiﬁcantlyreducingthemodel’sﬁt. The goodnessofﬁt statisticsindicate
that large fraction of the observed variation is captured by our model. Much of this, especially in
the share equations, is accounted for by the ﬁxed effects.
Table B.3 provides additional information about the consistency of the estimated share values,
ﬁtted share values and own-pricedemand elasticities in light of economic theory. We ﬁrst compare
the observed cost shares to values found in both aggregate data (U.S. Department of Commerce)
and another microeconomic study (Hazilla and Kopp 1990). Our estimates generally fall between
the two estimates reﬂecting the fact that the historical scope of our data lies between the the more
recent aggregate data and the older Hazilla and Kopp study.
Next we examine whether the ﬁtted cost shares (e.g., factor demands) are positive and whether
the own-priceelasticities arenegative.35 Only a few of the ﬁtted cost shares turn out to be negative.
This typically occurs in those industries where one or more shares is near zero (petroleum, for
35This is less restrictive than the concavity required by economic theory but is simpler to verify.
37example, where materials account for over 90% of costs). However, a large number of the own-
price elasticities are positive, especially capital. This means that the factor demand schedules are
locally upward sloping in many cases, contradicting economic theory.
A commonly acknowledged problem with the translog cost function is it’s inability to accu-
rately capture relatively inelastic factor demand (Perroni and Rutherford 1996). Because the elas-
ticity varies with the factor shares, an average own-price elasticity near zero will imply that many
of the locally evaluated elasticities will be positive. This is in fact what we observe.
By estimating an alternative Cobb-Douglas model, we verify that the observed positive own-
price elasticities do not have important consequences for our primary results. This model re-
stricts the factor demands by imposing an own-price elasticity of -1. This speciﬁcation leads to
an aggregate36 estimate of the offset associated with environmental expenditures of 0.28, larger
but insigniﬁcantly different from the translog estimate of −0:18. Since the Cobb-Douglas restric-
tion is strongly rejected based on the log-likelihood test, we continue to focus our attention on the
unrestricted model.
B.1 Distinguishing Environmental and Non-Environmental Cost Shares
Our econometric model is novel in that we estimate a cost function associated solely with produc-
tion of conventional output Y alongside factor shares associated with the production of both Y and
abatement effort. We are unable to estimate a cost function associated with abatement because we
are unable to control for the scale of abatement, which is unobserved. Also, the raw data do not
allow us to distinguish between those factor inputs used for abatement and those used for conven-
tional production, making it impossible to estimate share equations associated solely with conven-
tional production. However, the model speciﬁed in (3) circumvents this problem, distinguishing
econometrically between factors used for environmental and non-environmental production.
To understand how environmental and non-environmental cost shares are identiﬁed, it is useful
36E.g., across the four large expenditure industries: pulp and paper, plastics, petroleum and steel.































































































































Comparison of average value shares
capital 0.056 0.092 0.059 0.063 0.074 0.020 0.060 0.026 0.136 0.015 0.047
labor 0.141 0.201 0.359 0.085 0.238 0.019 0.230 0.236 0.370 0.118 0.333



















material 0.774 0.587 0.558 0.794 0.657 0.939 0.606 0.723 0.448 0.861 0.598
capital 0.131 0.153 0.166 0.173 0.302 0.105 0.074 0.099 0.166 0.063 0.067
labor 0.177 0.265 0.350 0.180 0.314 0.071 0.299 0.366 0.387 0.123 0.414















material 0.678 0.530 0.471 0.598 0.370 0.803 0.532 0.523 0.428 0.805 0.508
capital 0.020 0.066 0.054 0.059 0.071 0.055 0.061 0.032 0.166 0.032 0.021
labor 0.116 0.202 0.362 0.212 0.146 0.039 0.258 0.292 0.387 0.231 0.298
















material 0.852 0.685 0.574 0.689 0.672 0.870 0.647 0.660 0.428 0.727 0.668
Fraction of observations with negative estimated share values (zeros are omitted)d
capital 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.002 0.004 0.060 0.024 0.027 0.038 0.101 0.069
labor 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.025
energy 0.002 0.025 0.027 0.007
material
Fraction of observations with positiveown-priceelasticities (zeros are omitted)d
capital 0.968 0.730 0.526 0.436 0.485 0.287 0.692 0.121 0.288 0.218 0.971
labor 0.037 0.559 0.277 0.389 0.007 1.000 0.176
energy 0.070 0.171 0.061 0.010 0.415 0.237 0.032 0.134 0.188 0.004 0.069
material 0.184 0.130 0.035 0.077 0.200 0.138 0.054 0.013 1.000 0.137
aAverage of the observed share values in each industry.
bEnergy, materials and value added expenditures are from the 1987Benchmark Input-OutputTables, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce (April, 1994). Further breakdown of value added is based on a more detailed version of Gross
Product Originatingdata, U.S. Department of Commerce (August, 1996).
cFrom Hazilla and Kopp (1986).
39to consider a simpler model where production costs are given by
PC =0+klogPk + l logPl + e logPe + m logPm








etc. Here, the translog speciﬁcations have been simpliﬁed to Cobb-Douglas and all plant, time and
scale effects have been suppressed. The share equations can be rewritten




Based on (B.3) one way to view the distinction between cost shares is how variation in the level
of regulatory expenditures leads to different aggregate factor shares, all else equal. Suppose, for
example, that no abatement occurs and R=(R + PC)=0 . The observed cost share of capital
would then reveal the value of k, the underlying non-environmental cost share. In contrast, if no
production of conventional output Y occurs and R=(R + PC)=1 , the observed cost share of
capital would reveal the value of γk, the underlying environmental cost share. While we are un-
likely to observe such extreme cases, variation in R=(R+PC)coupled with our speciﬁc modeling
assumptions are sufﬁcient to distinguish environmental from non-environmental factor inputs.
If the ratio of regulatory expenditures to total costs,
R
R+PC is constant, this method of identi-
ﬁcation will not work.37 That is, if R
R+PC is constant, it becomes colinear with the constant term
in (B.3). However, jointly estimating the production cost model with the share equations contin-
ues to identify all the parameters even in this case. Speciﬁcally, the ’s will be identiﬁed by the
cost/price elasticities in the cost function and the γ’s will be identiﬁed by the difference betweeen
those cost/priceelasticities and the observed aggregateshare values. In other words, as input prices
vary,changes in non-environmentalproductioncostsPCidentifythe parameters. Descrepancies
between these values and the observed cost shares then reveal the γ parameter values.
The standard motivation for estimating the share equations jointly with the cost function is to
improve efﬁciency by providing multiple relations (cost functionand share equations) that involve
37In the petroleum sector, this ratio varies from less than 0.01% to slightly more than 11.0% with a mean of 1.1%
and standard deviation of 1.2%.
40only those parameters in the original cost function. Under the aforementioned circumstances,
however, this gain is nulliﬁedby the additional parameters that appear in the share equations (γ’s).
It is therefore possible that this effort to estimate multiple equations will be no more efﬁcient
than the estimation of a single cost function equation. These circumstances require (a) a lack of
variation in R=(R + PC), the share of reported regulatory expenditures in total costs, and (b)
additional parameters γ that appear one-for-one with each  appearing in the share equations.38
To the extent that these conditions are not satisﬁed, there continue to be efﬁciency gains from joint
estimation.
B.2 Parameter Validity
Since our goal is to use the estimated parameters to compute the cost of environmental expendi-
tures, the validity of these parameter estimates is critical.39 Our estimates hinge on the following
key assumptions:
1. The translog cost function given in Equation (2) provides a reasonable local approximation
to the true underlying cost function.
2. The data are measured accurately.
3. Input prices and the level of output are ﬁxed prior to the plant’s production decisions each
period.
There are, of course, groundsto question each of these assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption deals
with speciﬁcation: if the model is misspeciﬁed, the parameter estimates will be biased. More to
the point, the parameters are no longer structural in the sense of revealing the true nature of a
production technology. However, this is a criticism with little practical import since our model is
more ﬂexible than other models which have been applied to the same problem. For the industries
with smallersamples discussed in Section4.3, onemightarguethatour speciﬁcation is tooﬂexible.
38If, for example, the model for PCwere translog and the model for environmental costs were Cobb-Douglas, the
number of additional parameters γ would be smaller than the number of original parameters , reducing this effect.
39The consistency of the estimated parameters with economic theory, e.g., positive and downward sloping factor
demand, is explored in Table B.3 and discussed in the Appendix.
41The second assumption raises the issue of measurement error in the data – a problem widely
acknowledgedwithregardtoPACE data. However,sincewewanttorelatereportedexpendituresto
actualcosts, whetherornotreportedexpendituresaccuratelyreﬂectsomewell-deﬁnedcost concept
is not particularly important. Our concern that reported expenditures might be a poor indicator of
related changes in production costs actually hinges on the presence of some measurement error.
To the extent that this measurement error might be exacerbated by our ﬁxed-effects approach – an
issue often cited in discussions of panel data (Griliches 1979) – there are several countervailing
points.40 The ﬁrst is that the exacerbation of measurement error bias in ﬁxed-effects estimates
hingeson theassumption that themeasurement erroris less correlatedacross observationsfromthe
sameplant thantheunderlyingregressor (trueregulatoryexpenditures). Ifinstead themeasurement
error is more correlated– as might arise if variationinplant accounting is the major source of error
– a ﬁxed-effects model removes measurement error.41 Second, even if there is a bias, it is unclear
which direction it goes. With both positive and negative estimates of non-environmental offsets,
a bias towards zero has ambiguous results in the aggregate. Finally and most importantly, any
concern about measurement error must be balanced against the possibility of omitted variablebias.
Given the long list of potential confounding variables which could affect both reported regulatory
expenditures and total costs, the risk of falsely attributing such effects to reported expenditures
leads us to side strongly with the ﬁxed-effects model.
The last assumption deals with the issue of endogeneity. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in
the effect of increased environmental expenditures – presummably caused by tighter regulations –
on non-environmental expenditures. If changes in non-environmental expenditures instead affect
environmental expenditures, or if some omitted variable besides regulation affects both, the esti-
40Measurement error in a given variable biases that coefﬁcient estimate towards zero. See Section 9.5 of Greene
(1990)regardingthegeneral issueofbias duetomeasurement errorandChamberlain(1984)orHsiao (1986)regarding
the issue of measurement error in panel data.
41Gray and Shadbegian (1994) make exactly the opposite point: if measurement error has nothing to do with
differences between plants, usinga ﬁxed-effects model willserve onlytoremove a large fraction ofthe real underlying
variation in data, e.g., between plants. This leaves measurement error as a larger percentage of the remaining within-
plantvariation. Such an effect wouldtend tofavorthe random-effects orpooledmodels, where between plantvariation
is preserved. We see no reason, however, to believe that measurement error is less related to plant differences than the
true variation.
42mated parameters may be biased.42 For example, suppose that downtime is a signiﬁcant expense
and that plants have a number of planned production upgrades which remain unimplemented be-
cause of these downtime costs. When it becomes necessary to stop production to install additional
abatement equipment, these queued projects might be then simultaneously undertaken. This “har-
vesting” of non-environmental projects introduces a negative correlation between between envi-
ronmental expenditures and annual production costs – especially if the full cost of the downtime
is attributed to environmental expenditures and the non-environmental projects are productivity
enhancing.
Whether such a decrease in production costs is attributable to increased environmental ex-
penditures depends on whether the non-environmental improvements would, in fact, have been
implemented anyway. If so, we would have to view increased environmental expenditures as an
endogenous outcome of the decision to shut down production (made by the plant), rather than
an exogenous consequence of tighter regulation (made by some external authority). Deily and
Gray (1991) have gone even further, arguing that the level of external regulatory stringency and
enforcement is itself sensitive to productivity shocks (e.g., production costs), potentially making
environmental expenditures endogenous even if they are beyond the control of the plant.
There is no easy way to deal with this potential endogeneity. On the one hand, there has
been considerable exogenous variation over time in regulatory stringency.43 This only indirectly
addresses the issue, however, by suggesting the endogenous response is likely to be small. On
the other hand, instrumental variables which might be used to isolate only exogenous changes in
regulation are likely to vary only across plants.44 As pointed out in Section 3.3, using variation
across plants to estimate the effect of regulation is itself problematic because of omitted plant-
speciﬁc variables. It is our belief that omitted-variables bias is the more signiﬁcant of these two
42In particular, we need environmental expenditures to be predetermined (see Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983).
43The level of stringency of air, water, and waste regulations increased signiﬁcantly over the period of our data
(1979-91). In (real) dollar terms, total environmental expenditures (with investment outlays annualized at a 7% dis-
count rate) have doubled over the period (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1990) while reported annual PACE
expenditures have increased by 50%.
44For example, the instruments used by Gray and Shadbegian (1994) – activeness of state enforcement, fuel use,
inclusion in a non-attainment area – are all primarily, if not exclusively, plant-speciﬁc characteristics.
43problems.45 In Section 4.2 we see that this omitted-variable bias is potentially quite large.
45Gray and Shadbegian (1994)testthe exogeneity ofregulatoryexpenditures withrespect tooutputand failto reject
that hypothesis. The relevance of the their test to our predicament is unclear, however, since they are using a different
dependent variable and are focused on cross-section variation, which we ignore.
44